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THE ANGEL IS IN THE BIG PICTURE:
A RESPONSE TO LEMLEY
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An invention within close reach of multiple inventors differs from an in-
vention within distant reach of a lone inventor. The differences between
these two archetypes of invention-"reinventables" and "singletons"-
remain unexploited under current U.S. law. Should we reform the law to
exploit the differences? Mark Lemley' and I agree that we should. To date,
those economists who have closely examined the issue concur.'
What are the differences between reinventables and singletons? First, re-
inventables can be brought into existence with incentives of lower
magnitude. This suggests that we can obtain reinventables at a lower price
than we currently pay-i.e., with less monopoly loss than we incur today.
Second, reinventables generate disproportionately more haste and redun-
dancy, as the rival inventors race and duplicate each other's efforts. This
suggests that we already pay more, in rent dissipation and lost opportunity,
for reinventables than for singletons (holding all other things equal). Third,
reinventables generate disproportionately more litigation as the race win-
ners, or the "trolls" to whom the winners transfer patents, eat up time and
* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. For helpful com-
ments, the author thanks Brett Frischman and Jing-Yuan Chiou.
I. Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying? 105 MIcH. L.
REV. 1525 (2007).
2. See Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. EcON. REV. 92 (2006); Emeric Henry, Run-
ner-up Patents: Is Monopoly Inevitable? (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
ssrn.comlabstract=922316. See also Vincenzo Denicolb & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Patents, Secrets,
and the First-Inventor Defense, 13 EcoN. & MGMT. STRATEGY 517 (2004); Manfredi La Manna,
Ross Macleod & David de Meza, The Case for Permissive Patents, 33 EUR. EcON. REV. 1427
(1989); Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in Intellec-
tual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002); Elisabetta Ottoz & Franco Cugno, The Independent
Invention Defence in a Cournot Duopoly Model, EcON. BULL. at 1, June 20, 2004, http://
economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2004/volumel 2/EB-04L10005A.pdf.
1537
Michigan Law Review
resources suing the inventors who finished a close second or third.' This
suggests that we already pay more in administrative costs for reinventables
than for singletons.
The angel is in the big picture in that there is consensus among those
who have closely examined the issue that we should reform the law to ex-
ploit these differences. The devil is in the details of just how to reform it.
Naturally, professional economists have elided the law-related details, fo-
cusing instead on their models-models that show an increase in social
welfare if the law is reformed so that reinventables hold out the prospect of
shared duopoly.
4
Lemley and I, in contrast, take a stab at some of the details of how legal
reform could take shape. My proposal is that we regard an independent in-
ventor ("reinventor") as exempt from the first inventor's patent, provided
that the reinventor completed the invention before receiving notice that the
first inventor had already completed it.5 Lemley expresses three reservations
about my proposed reinvention defense, and then offers four alternative pro-
posals.
I. LEMLEY'S THREE RESERVATIONS
Lemley's first reservation is a general one: we are playing with fire. His-
tory shows that the most important inventions are often invented by multiple
inventors at roughly the same time. This implies that the reinvention defense
will have a disproportionately greater effect on the most important inven-
tions, which implies that the reinvention defense might turn out to be penny
wise and pound foolish.
Point well taken. We are indeed tinkering near the bull's-eye of inven-
tion. The expected social cost of delaying an important invention-one as
important as, say, the polio vaccine-may be so high as to justify the insur-
ance premium we pay in the form of the social costs attributable to treating
reinventables and singletons as if they were the same. I concede, therefore,
that neither the courts nor Congress should adopt the reinvention defense
tomorrow. It needs to be vetted for a few years. Ideally, the vetting process
would provide some answers to the following questions about magnitudes:
3. Recent scholarship suggests that many if not most patent suits are against independent
inventors and not against pirates or firms that deliberately tried to invent around the patent. See
James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes, 96 AMER.
EcON. REV. 77 (2006); James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion
(Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 05-18, 2005), available at http://ssm.coml
abstract=831685.
4. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 2; Henry, supra note 2.
5. More precisely, the reinventor must complete the invention before receiving the earlier of
sufficient actual notice or sufficient constructive notice that the first inventor already invented it.
Notice is sufficient when it includes enough information about the invention that a person of ordi-
nary skill in the relevant technical art could, by reading the notice, make and use the invention. The
reinventor receives constructive notice when the first inventor first discloses the requisite informa-
tion to the relevant public via, for example, a scientific article, conference, press release, or
published patent application.
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How much monopoly loss is attributable to reinventables under current law?
How much hasty and redundant R&D is there? What percentage of impor-
tant inventions are invented by multiple inventors at about the same time?
How often would reinvention lead to Cournot duopoly (under which prices
moderately exceed those under free competition) rather than Bertrand du-
opoly (under which prices are driven down to those under free
competition)? Most importantly, to what extent are reinventables more a
function of forces exogenous to the patent system than singletons are?
Lemley's second reservation addresses my claim that the fact of reinven-
tion-that multiple inventors converged on the same invention at about the
same time-is evidence that a moderately smaller incentive would have suf-
ficed to bring forth the invention in a timely manner. He argues that the truth
of my claim depends on the type of invention in question. Some inventions
(e.g., pharmaceuticals) are cheap to invent but expensive to test for safety
and efficacy. These inventions may require the extra incentive provided by
our current winner-take-all patent system.
Again, point well taken. One would expect underproduction of drugs if
inventors could invent them cheaply and then free-ride on the costly efforts
of other inventors to test the drugs for safety and efficacy. This problem,
however, is fairly confined to drugs, and the FDA already deals with it by
granting five years of market exclusivity to a new drug applicant who con-
ducts the trials required for FDA approval.6 If the reinvention defense
nevertheless exacerbated the free-riding problem, we could respond by ex-
tending the term of FDA market exclusivity beyond five years.
Lemley's third reservation is that the reinvention defense would degrade
the market for patents. It is much easier, he argues, to sell a guaranteed right
of exclusion than to sell a potentially defeasible right of exclusion. If the
reinvention defense were available, buyers of patents would never know if
they were buying a patent monopoly or merely the right to participate in a
duopoly or triopoly.
This point is less well taken. It paints a false dichotomy between guaran-
teed exclusivity and potentially defeasible exclusivity. Under current law,
sellers of patents already fall far short of being able to guarantee exclusivity.
Almost half of all litigated patents are either invalidated or held unenforce-
able for inequitable conduct.7 Other potential gaps in exclusivity include the
following: shop rights, patent exhaustion, laches, failure to mark, lapse of
patent for failure to pay maintenance fees, the existence of an interfering or
overlapping patent, and ambiguous patent scope. In short, the additional
uncertainty generated by the reinvention defense would be a drop in the
bucket.
6. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA will not accept a competitor's application to sell
the same drug until five years after the date of approval of the first application. Drug Price Competi-
tion and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
7. 1 derived this estimate from numbers reported in Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and
Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000), reprinted in
II FED. CIR. B.J. 209 (2001). See also John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on
the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998).
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To minimize the size of that drop, the reinventor should be allowed to
transfer the reinvention defense only through assignment to a single party
and not through license to multiple parties. The assignee of the defense
could likewise transfer the defense only through subsequent assignment to a
single party. In countries that recognize prior user rights, the transfer of such
rights is similarly limited.' This limitation ensures that only one party at any
given time possesses a given defense to a given patent, which spares buyers
of patents from the prospect of playing whack-a-mole with a multitude of
defense-raising infringers.
By retarding the reinventor's ability to coordinate multi-party produc-
tion, this limitation also amounts to a de facto constraint on the reinventor's
output. The patentee, in contrast, would retain the unlimited rights of trans-
ferability that she has under current law, including the right to license out
the patent to multiple parties. This asymmetry between the transferability of
the patent rights and the transferability of the reinvention defense increases
the chances that the patentee and the reinventor will share a Cournot du-
opoly rather than a Bertrand duopoly.
II. LEMLEY'S FOUR ALTERNATIVE REFORMS
Lemley floats four alternative reforms that merit consideration and that
should serve as invitations to further research. Below are preliminary obser-
vations about each reform.
A. Exempt Reinventors from Willfulness Damages
Lemley proposes that we reserve willfulness damages for those who ac-
tually copy the patentee's technology. The Patent Act grants courts the
discretion to award up to treble damages if the infringer infringed willfully.9
As courts have defined it, willfully means knowingly. For example, an in-
fringer willfully infringes if the infringer continues to make, use, or sell the
invention after learning that a patent on it exists (unless the infringer obtains
a reasoned legal opinion that the patent is invalid or does not cover the in-
vention).
Reserving willfulness damages for pirates is certainly compelling from
the standpoint of fairness and equity. At first glance, it is also compelling
from the standpoint of efficiency. Holding reinventors liable for the same
damages as pirates seems to bias the system in favor of pirates because it
effectively punishes reinventors more severely than pirates. Pirates pay once
in the form of damages, whereas reinventors pay twice--once in the form of
damages and again in the form of the unrecouped costs of R&D.
8. Statement by Martin J. Adelman, Professor, George Washington Univ. Law Sch. (Oct.
11, 2006). In some countries, the transfer of prior user fights is further limited to transfer only
through sale of the business or enterprise in which the rights arose. Robert L. Rohrback, Prior User
Rights: Roses or Thorns? 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 3 (Fall 1993).
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2000).
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This proposed reform, however, has several shortcomings. First, its ef-
fect would be small. Most of the patent damages awarded each year are for
compensation, not for willfulness. Under current law, damages for willful-
ness constitute perhaps 20% to 25% of the total combined damages awarded
in patent suits every year.'0 If willfulness damages were reserved for pirates,
patentees' expected damages would drop only by the fraction of this 20% to
25% that is currently attributable to reinventors as opposed to pirates. This
fraction is, I suspect, relatively low. Even when courts find that infringement
is willful, they are not required to award willfulness damages." Indeed, in
only about half of the cases in which courts find willful infringement do
they exercise their discretion to award willfulness damages. 2 I would bet
that courts today are more likely to award willfulness damages against pi-
rates than against reinventors. If that bet is right, then in effect the law has
already partially adopted Lemley's reform.
Second, although full and explicit adoption of Lemley's reform would
generate an incrementally larger effect, that increment might be harmful. If
reinventors were always exempt from willfulness damages, patents on rein-
ventables would provide marginally lower money damages and thus
marginally lower market exclusivity. Anticipating this, risk-neutral inventors
ex ante would expect a slightly lower return for reinventables. Most inven-
tors, however, are at least a bit risk-averse. Under current law, the threat of
being slapped with treble damages adds to the considerable risk inherent in
pursuing inventions. From the ex ante perspective of inventors-who do not
yet know whether they will finish the race first or second-the absolute ex-
emption of reinventors from willfulness damages would eliminate the threat
of treble damages while only marginally reducing the objective (risk-
neutral) expected return on invention. Because risk aversion rises non-
linearly, and because people tend to be more sensitive to potential loss than
to potential gain, the overall effect might be an increase in the incentive to
pursue reinventables. As I argue in the main paper, an increase in the incen-
tive to pursue reinventables is not what we want. What we want is to
moderately decrease that incentive in order to reduce hasty and redundant
R&D.
Third, this reform would not significantly reduce the rate or costs of pat-
ent litigation. In the vast majority of cases, compensatory damages and the
threat of injunction provide sufficient incentive to generate litigation.
Although this reform is compelling from the standpoint of fairness and
equity, it seems ambiguous from the standpoint of efficiency. This reform
holds out the prospect of marginal decreases in monopoly loss and litigation
costs, but with potentially larger increases in hasty and redundant R&D.
10. See Ronald B. Coolley, Overview and Statistical Study of the Law on Patent Damages,
75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 515, 531-32 (1993).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 284 ("[Tlhe court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed.") (emphasis added).
12. I derived this estimate from numbers reported in Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statis-
tics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227 (2004), and in Moore, supra note 7.
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B. Treat Reinvention as Evidence of Obviousness
Lemley also proposes that we treat reinvention as evidence of the obvi-
ousness of the patented invention. This proposal would clearly increase the
internal consistency of the law of obviousness. Courts routinely accept a
"long felt need" for the invention and the "failure of others" to achieve the
invention as evidence of non-obviousness. 3 Consistency seems to demand
that the courts accept the opposite-short felt need and the success of others
(i.e., reinvention)-as evidence of obviousness.
Yet, this reform seems volatile and difficult to calibrate. The incentive to
invent would be sensitive to small fluctuations in the weight that courts ac-
cord to reinvention as evidence of obviousness. And it is hard to see how
courts could determine how much weight they should accord. When a court
declares a patented invention obvious, anyone can enter the market. Thus, if
reinvention were recognized as strong evidence of obviousness, this reform
would cut deeply into the incentives to invent reinventables.
The risk of unduly large cuts in incentives is exacerbated by a free-
riding problem. Presumably, the ability to proffer reinvention as evidence of
obviousness would not rest exclusively in the hands of the reinventor. The
ability of an infringer to offer evidence of obviousness has never been con-
ditioned on the infringer's status as a pirate, reinventor, or anything else.
Therefore, if courts regarded reinvention as evidence of obviousness, any
infringer could invalidate a patent based on the efforts of the reinventor,
which means pirates would free-ride on the efforts of reinventors, thereby
further reducing the ex ante incentives to invent reinventables.
C. Exempt Reinventors from Injunction
Lemley suggests we reserve injunctions for pirates. This reform, unlike
his proposed reform of willfulness damages, would have a marked effect-
because injunctions are quite valuable, perhaps more valuable than compen-
satory damages. 4 In addition to reducing monopoly loss and rent
dissipation, this reform would reduce litigation costs insofar as hold-ups are
predicated on the availability of injunction.
In short, it appears that this reform would have essentially the same ef-
fect the reinvention defense would have, just less of it. Whether this lesser
effect is desirable cannot be answered definitively until we answer some of
the questions about magnitudes listed in Part I.
13. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 276, 279 (1944); Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. &
Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 53-54, 59, 68 (1923); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appli-
ances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
14. The title of the following practice-oriented article is telling: Alan Ratliff, It's Not Just
About Injunctions Anymore: An Overview of Money Damages in Intellectual Property Litigation, 7
IP LITIGATOR 2 (No. 3, March 2001).
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D. Adopt Prior User Rights
Lemley further suggests prior user rights as an alternative to the reinven-
tion defense. The scope and content of prior user rights vary among the
countries that have adopted them." If we pick from the mdlange an average
or standard form of prior user rights, we can define a prior user as someone
who copied or independently invented the invention and began to commer-
cialize it before the patentee filed her application. A prior user has the right
to commercialize the invention, but only to the same extent and in the same
manner that he had begun to commercialize it before the patentee filed her
application.
Like Lemley's reform of injunctive relief, prior user rights would have
essentially the same effect the reinvention defense would have, just less of
it. Indeed, the reinvention defense can be characterized as merely a strong
form of prior user rights that more selectively targets reinventables. The re-
invention defense is stronger and more targeted than standard prior user
rights in three senses. First, to qualify for the defense, the reinventor must
invent independently. Copying the invention from the first inventor will not
do.
Second, the reinvention defense imposes neither fixed limits on how the
reinventor may commercialize the invention nor a requirement that the rein-
ventor must have begun commercializing the invention within the
reinvention window.
Third, the reinvention defense generates greater and more direct incen-
tives for inventors to disclose their inventions to other inventors earlier
rather than later. This is especially true given the peculiarities of the U.S.
patent system. Outside the United States, patents are awarded to the first to
file the patent application rather than to the first to invent. In first-to-file
systems, inventors have very strong incentives to file applications early, and
all of those applications are published eighteen months after they are filed.
Under U.S. law, neither first inventors nor trailing inventors have very
strong incentives to file applications early. Regardless of who files first, only
the first inventor will be entitled to the patent in the vast majority of cases. If
we adopt the reinvention defense, it will generate strong incentives for in-
ventors both to file applications earlier and to disclose their inventions
earlier-because disclosure shuts the window on would-be reinventors.
If we adopt standard prior user rights, it will give inventors incentive to
file applications earlier than they do under current law. It will not, however,
give inventors incentive to disclose their inventions prior to the Patent Of-
fice's publication of the applications eighteen months after filing.
Furthermore, the Patent Office does not publish all U.S. applications eight-
een months after filing. A U.S. applicant can elect to postpone publication
until the patent is granted provided the applicant is willing to forgo seeking
a patent on the same invention in foreign countries. The upshot is that, com-
pared to standard prior user rights, the reinvention defense will create
15. See Rohrback, supra note 8, at 3.
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greater incentives for first inventors to promptly notify rivals that they have
lost the race. Accordingly, the reinvention defense will lead to earlier termi-
nation of hasty and redundant efforts by rivals to achieve the same
invention.
CONCLUSION
Two of Lemley's proposed reforms--concerning willfulness and obvi-
ousness-are compelling yet problematic. The remaining two-concerning
injunctive relief and prior user rights-would have more or less the same
effect as the reinvention defense, just less of it. The reinvention defense
would cut out more monopoly loss and rent dissipation. It would also cut
out more of the incentive to invent reinventables. Whether the trade-off in-
herent in the reinvention defense is superior to the smaller trade-off inherent
in these two alternative reforms depends on how far we should go in treating
reinventables and singletons differently. The economic models suggest that
we should go as far as the reinvention defense, if not farther. Yet, the simpli-
fying assumptions in the models must give us pause. Ultimately, how far we
should go depends on how much reinventables really differ from singletons.
More specifically, how far we should go depends on the extent to which
reinventables are a greater function of forces exogenous to the patent system
than are singletons. Perhaps a researcher from a discipline more equipped to
characterize such forces16 will answer that question for us. Until then, all we
have is the informed intuition that inventors often converge because they
often merge onto paths of least resistance-paths carved by the laws of na-
ture, by the state of technology, by unanticipated social change, and by
chance.
16. One candidate discipline is scientometrics, which is the science of measuring and analyz-
ing the advance of science and technology. See, e.g., D.K. Simonton, Multiple Discovery: Some
Monte Carlo Simulations and Gedanken Experiments, 9 SCIENTOMETRICS 269 (1986).
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